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NLRB Crackdown on Unions: Union Fines and
Sympathy Strikes
I. INTRODUCTION
In two distinct areas of labor law, the National Labor Relations
Board1 , with considerable court approval, has taken increasingly
strict views toward unions in areas involving union fines in a strike
setting and sympathy strikers. As a result of these seemingly minor
changes in Board law in these areas, utilization of the union's most
effective means of economic warfare against an employer-the
strike-has been significantly weakened.
The importance of the strike in the history of the labor move-
ment cannot be overstated. During the 19th century, strikes were
the chief means of improving wages and working conditions.2 Due
to the violent strikes in the latter part of the century, a presiden-
tial commission to study the problems of strikes was formed in
1894.' The commission suggested that employers should recognize
and deal with labor organizations, with the expectation that if em-
ployers took labor into consultation at proper times, much of the
severity of strikes could be tempered and the number of strikes
reduced. 4 Such suggestions signalled the beginnings of a variety of
judicial and legislative attempts to regulate the employment rela-
tionship in the history of the American labor movement, and
culminated in the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act.5
Of course, the utilization and characteristics of strikes have
changed since the enactment of the NLRA as labor-management
relations have matured. As experience with collective- bargaining
accumulates, employers and unions become more adept at peace-
fully resolving disputes. Presently it is as a last resort, for the most
part, that unions strike in attempts to resolve disputes with em-
ployers. As one commentator has noted, the NLRA fosters collec-
tive bargaining and seeks to insure that employees, through organi-
zation, have an equal bargaining position. However, organization of
1. Hereinafter referred to as "the Board."
2. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS 872 (1945).
3. C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 872 (1971).
4. Id. at 13.
5. Hereinafter referred to as "NLRA" and "the Act."
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employees strengthens their bargaining position chiefly through
their reserve power to exercise their aggregate economic strength
by means of the strike.6
First, this comment will provide an overview of the development
of Board and court decisions concerning union fines levied against
employees who cross the picket lines, as well as those decisions im-
pacting sympathy strikes. Secondly, recent Board pronouncements
in these areas will be analyzed in terms of their effect upon the
union's ability to exert economic pressure upon an employer
through the use of a strike.
II. UNION FINES ON RESIGNING MEMBERS IN THE FACE OF A
STRIKE: THE NEW RULES
Under section 7 of the NLRA, employees are guaranteed both
the right to engage in concerted activities and the right to refrain
from any or all such activities. 7 Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA
details the rights of individual employees with respect to labor or-
ganizations, and specifically provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7 of the NLRA.' A proviso to
section 8(b)(1)(A) gives labor organizations the right to prescribe
their own rules with respect to acquisition and retention of mem-
bership.' In short, employees are free to join or refrain from joining
a union under section 7,10 and a union, in turn, must respect the
6. Magruder, Development of Collective Bargaining, 50 HAzv. L. REv. 1071 (1937)
(emphasis supplied).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-186 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 7 specifically states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157.
8. Section 8(b) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . (1) to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7:
Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention or membership
therein; ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(b).
9. Id.
10. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA permits employers and unions to enter into agree-
ments requiring employees to become members of the union on or after the thirtieth day of
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individual's choice under section 8(b)(1)(A). Further, under the
section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso, the union is granted certain privileges
to establish its own rules for membership.
Against this background comes the body of law which has devel-
oped concerning these competing rights, and the Supreme Court's
first discussion of the area of union fines in its 1967 decision in
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 1 In Allis-Chalmers,
the Supreme Court held, in agreement with the Board, that a
union does not restrain or coerce employees in violation of section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when it fines a member who crosses a picket
line and returns to work during a strike."2 The Court noted in
reaching its holding, that national labor policy has been built on
the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting
through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, em-
ployees have the most effective means of bargaining for improve-
ment in wages, hours and working conditions. The Court reasoned
that although the employee may disagree with many of the union's
decisions, he is nonetheless bound by them since the majority-rule
concept is unquestionably at the center of our federal labor pol-
icy.'3 The Court reasoned further that an integral part of this fed-
eral labor policy has been the power of the union to protect against
erosion of its status through reasonable discipline of members who
violate rules and regulations governing membership." As the Court
noted, "that power is particularly vital when the members engage
in strikes," since "the economic strike against the employer is the
employment with the employer. An employee is not required, however, to become a full
member of the union. The Supreme Court has defined the term "membership" as used in
section 8(a)(3) as encompassing only a financial obligation limited to the payment of fees
and dues. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). Section 8(a) provides, in
pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condi-
tion of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States,
shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not
established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section 8(a) of this Act
as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership
therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or
the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, .
29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
11. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
12. Id. at 178-89.
13. Id. at 180.
14. Id. at 181.
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ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon
its desired terms.' 1 5 "The power to fine or expel strikebreakers,"
the Court concluded, "is essential if the union is to be an effective
bargaining agent."' 16
In reviewing the legislative history of section 8(b)(1), the Court
noted that the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A)-reserving the right of
a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to ac-
quisition and retention of membership-was introduced as an
amendment on the Senate floor with the express statement that it
was not the intent of the sponsors to regulate the internal affairs of
unions.' 7 Significantly, the Allis-Chalmers Court expressly limited
its holding to the presumption that the employees fined were
union members.1 8 The effect of this decision was that in the face of
a stiff fine, union members would be reluctant to abandon the
picket line and return to work since the imposition of fines against
those who returned to work had been adjudged a lawful method of
discipline against strikebreakers.
The Supreme Court faced the issue of union fines again in 1972,
in NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, Granite State Joint
Board.'9 Although the Allis-Chalmers decision 'supported a union's
right to discipline active members who crossed picket lines, it did
not address the issue of a union's right to discipline those who re-
sign from the union in order to cross the picket line. In Granite
State, the Court answered this question, agreeing with the Board
that a union could not fine employees who were no longer mem-
bers. 0 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that
when there was a "lawful dissolution of union-member relation,
the union had no more control over the former member than it did
over the man in the street."' 21 In Granite State, Justice Douglas
observed that "neither the contract nor the Union's constitution or
bylaws contained any provision defining or limiting the circum-
stances under which a member could resign. '22 Several days before
the contract between the employer and the union was to expire, a
strike vote was taken during which the membership agreed to
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV.
1049 (1951).
17. 388 U.S. at 184-85; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
18. Alis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 196-97.
19. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
20. Id. at 217.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 214.
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strike if no agreement was reached. Following the expiration of the
contract, the parties could not reach an agreement, and the union
struck the employer. Following the onset of the strike, a union
meeting was held in which a majority of union members agreed
that any member aiding or abetting the employer during the strike
would be subject to a $2,000 fine. During the strike, thirty-one
members resigned their union membership, by letter, and crossed
the picket line. The union assessed a $2,000 fine upon each re-
signing member, and these fined members filed a charge with the
NLRB alleging a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The
Board agreed that the fines were unlawful,2 3 but the court of ap-
peals denied enforcement of the Board's order.24 Reversing, the
Supreme Court declined to give weight, as had the First Circuit, to
the fact that the resigning employees had participated in the vote
to strike.2 5 The Supreme Court noted that, "Events occurring after
the calling of strike may have unsettling effects which could lead a
member who voted in favor of a strike to change his mind." 6 The
Supreme Court further noted that the strike in question was still
in progress eighteen months after its inception, and that all but
two of the resigning members had not resigned until after the sixth
month of the strike. Reasoning that the duration of the strike
likely led to family hardship as well as increased likelihood of
striker replacement by the employer, the Court concluded that the
former members' participation in the strike vote had little impor-
tance.28 Significantly, the Granite State Court specifically limited
its holding to instances where there are no contractual restraints
on a member's right to resign, and cautioned that it was not decid-
ing to what extent the contractual relationship between union and
member might curtail the freedom to resign.2 9
One year later, in 1973, the Supreme Court was again called
upon to decide the lawfulness of union fines assessed against re-
signing members. In Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB,30 the Court
reviewed a determination that the union had violated section
8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRB by imposing $450 fines upon each re-
23. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union of Am., 187 N.L.R.B. 636 (1970).
24. NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union of Am., 446 F.2d 369
(lst Cir. 1971).





30. Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
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signing union member who crossed the picket line during a strike,
despite a "Misconduct of Members" clause in the union's constitu-
tion that imposed an obligation to refrain from strikebreaking.3 1
The union admitted that neither its constitution nor its bylaws
contained any specific prohibition on resignation. The Supreme
Court, in affirming the District Court of Columbia Circuit's en-
forcement of the Board order,8 2 noted that the mere general prohi-
bition against strikebreaking, as contained in the union's constitu-
tion, was insufficient to allow the union to justify its fine by
construing a restriction on resignations as falling under the "Mis-
conduct of Members" clause. 3 Again, the Court left open the ques-
tion of the extent to which contractual restrictions on members'
right to resign be limited under the NLRB expressly stating that it
was not deciding the issue in reaching its holding. 4
As a result of this line of cases, unions regularly employed provi-
sions in their constitutions and bylaws purporting to limit a mem-
ber's right of resignation. 5 The legitimacy of such provisions was
generally governed by the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in
Scofield v. NLRB,3 6 which defined the parameters of union en-
forcement of a disciplinary rule. In Scofield, which involved a
union rule relating to production ceilings, the Court held that a
disciplinary rule could only be enforced if the rule reflected a legit-
imate union interest, impaired no federal labor policy, and was rea-
sonably enforced against members who were otherwise free to re-
sign from the union to escape the rule.3
Since the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Scofield, Al-
lis-Chalmers and Granite State, the Board has carved out various
rules regarding restrictions on resignations, and has held that any
restriction on resignation must provide a meaningful period for the
exercise of the right to refrain from union activity.3" In UAW and
its Local No. 647 (General Electric Co.), the Board found that a
31. Id. at 89.
32. 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
33. Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 89.
34. Id. at 88.
35. 1 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 169 (2d ed. 1983). See also Note, A
Union's Right to Control Strike-Period Resignations, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 339, 342 n.19
(1985). As a practical matter, an employee who resigned union membership during a strike
would still be required to tender fees and dues once the strike settled and the employer and
union executed a new contract containing a union shop clause. See generally supra note 5.
36. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
37. Id. at 436.
38. UAW and its Local No. 647 (Gen. Elec. Co.), 197 N.L.R.B. 608 (1972).
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ten-day escape period, coupled with a sixty-day waiting period for
resignation to take effect was overly restrictive. 9 The Board has
also held, in Local 1384, United Auto Workers (Ex-Cell-O
Corp.)," that a union attempting to impose a fine upon a member
it claims has not effectively resigned bears the burden of producing
evidence, as well as the burden of persuasion, to establish that the
employee knew or had consented to the limitation of his right to
resign.41
In a 1977 case, Dalmo Victor 1,42 the Board found a section
8(b)(1)(A) violation in a union's fining of members who resigned
and crossed the picket line during a strike despite a constitutional
provision that prohibited resigning members from crossing the
picket line unless they had resigned more than fourteen days
before the strike commenced. In the Board's view, the constitu-
tional provision was not a restriction on resignation, but rather, an
unlawful attempt to control the post-resignation conduct of mem-
bers or former members." The Ninth Circuit denied enforcement
of the Board order, concluding that the union's constitutional pro-
vision was, in fact, meant as a restriction on a member's right to
resign, and noted that the Board's categorization of the provision
as a mere attempt to control post-resignation conduct was
"hypertechnical. ' '44 The Ninth Circuit specifically noted that the
union had asserted that the provision was enacted for the very
purpose of imposing contractual restrictions on a member's right
to resign.4" The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the Board for
the purpose of deciding whether the provision, viewed as a restric-
tion on resignations, was a valid restriction. 7 In 1982, pursuant to
the remand, the Board issued a supplemental decision and order in
which it defined the parameters for restrictions on resignations.
48
In its decision, the Board acknowledged the conflicting interests at
stake between union and employee; namely, the employee's section
39. Id.
40. Local 1384, UAW (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 227 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1977).
41. Id. at 1049.
42. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor), 231 N.L.R.B. 719
(1977).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 720.
45. NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor), 608 F.2d
1219, 1221 (9th Cir. 1979).
46. Id. at 1222.
47. Id.
48. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor), 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982), hereinafter re-
ferred to as Dalmo Victor II.
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7 right to refrain from collective activity versus the union's interest
in protecting employees it represents who have joined together in
collective economic activity.4 9 The Board concluded that reasona-
ble rules governing the acquisition or retention of membership in
the union, or resignation therefrom were necessary to protect the
union's interest and to facilitate the orderly management of its af-
fairs, particularly during periods when a strike is imminent or un-
derway. As a result, the Board ruled that a union could impose
reasonable time restrictions on the right of members to resign from
the union. 0 The Board conceded that a union's responsible and
operational effectiveness is a key component of national labor pol-
icy and enables the union to better represent the majority of its
members in the collective-bargaining process. 1
Notwithstanding these union interests, however, the Board went
on to conclude that the restrictions imposed by the union in
Dalmo Victor were unreasonable, and therefore violative of the
NLRA52 The Board noted that the union's rule of prohibiting res-
ignations unless received fourteen days before the onset of a strike
effectively limited union member resignation to nonstrike peri-
ods. 3 According to the Board, the Supreme Court's rational in
Granite State,6 4 which noted the unsettling effects of a strike, in-
cluding family hardship on a member, required the Board to reach
only one conclusion: that a union member could not be prohibited
from resigning at the very time he would most like to do so. As one
commentator has noted, the right to resign cannot be confined to
those few periods when the member is least likely to be dis-
enchanted with his union. 5 This commentary goes to the heart of
the issue. Put simply, members will most want to resign their
union membership during strike times, so that they can cross the
picket line and return to work free of union discipline. At the same
time; unions need the power to discipline members if they choose
to resign membership to cross a picket line and return to work, so
as to be effectively able to call a strike, with certainty as to its
support. If too many employees can freely cross the picket line, the
employer may well be able to continue operations without the
49. Id. at 985.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 986.
53. Id.
54. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
55. Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 1022, 1044 (1976).
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strikers, and accordingly, withstand any pressure the union might
attempt to bring to bear upon the employer.
In attempting to resolve this conflict between union and em-
ployee interests, the Board held that a union rule which limits a
union member's right to resign to nonstrike periods constitutes an
unreasonable restriction on a member's section 7 rights.5 6 The
Board then pronounced its own rule for what it would consider a
valid restriction on resignations. 7 This rule allows union members
to resign at any time, including times when a strike is in progress,
but with resignations not taking effect for thirty days. Such a rule,
the Board concluded, is a reasonable accommodation of the em-
ployees' desires to return to work during a strike and the union's
responsibility to protect the interests of its remaining membership
as well as to take care of administrative matters incident to the
resignations.
5 8
Critics of the Board's thirty-day rule, beginning with the concur-
ring opinion in Dalmo Victor II by Board Chairman Van De Water
and Member Hunter, have questioned the Board's thirty-day cut-
off." There appears to be no particular significance to the time
frame of thirty days, and indeed, the concurring opinion in Dalmo
Victor II asks why ten days is too short, and thirty-one days too
long. 0 As the concurring members of the Board note, an employer
can and often does hire replacements immediately after a strike
commences, and while a thirty-day waiting period, enforceable by
substantial fines, may appear to be "reasonable," the real life di-
lemma created for the employee subjected to the rule is that his
job may be long gone by the time he is able to take any meaningful
steps to save it." This is so because a striking employee who is
permanently replaced during an economic strike has reinstatement
rights to his former position, but only upon the departure of the
permanent replacement.6 2 Thus, once a strike commences, an em-
56. Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. at 986.
57. Id. at 987.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 991. Members Zimmerman and Fanning found a section 8(b)(1)(A) violation
and thereafter pronounced the new 30-day rule; Member Hunter and Chairman Van de
Water concurred in the finding of violation but specificallly disagreed with the 30-day rule.
For a detailed review of alternative suggestions to govern union resignations, see Comment,
Union Security and Union Members' Freedom to Resign: The National Labor Relations
Board's Thirty-Day Rule In Dalmo Victor, 14 Tax. TECH L. REV. 593, 611 (1983).
60. Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. at 991 n.45.
61. Id. at 991 n.46.
62. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969). An eco-
nomic strike is one that is neither caused nor prolonged by an unfair labor practice on the
1986
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ployer may immediately replace workers permanently. An em-
ployee who chooses to wait thirty days for his resignation to take
effect so as to avoid a union fine might well find, upon crossing the
picket line to return to work, that he has been permanently re-
placed. Such an employee would then only be able to return to
work if his replacement should happen to be fired or resign.
In yet another clarification of the matter, the Board, in 1984,
backed away from the thirty-day rule in Dalmo Victor H and con-
cluded in International Association of Machinists, Local 1414
(Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc.), 3 that any restriction a union may
impose on resignations is invalid and violative of section
8(b)(1)(A). 4 The Board noted that although the union has an in-
terest in maintaining the solidarity, a rule restricting resignations
nonetheless impairs fundamental policies embedded in the labor
laws, an impairment impliedly prohibited, in the Board's view, by
the Supreme Court's Scofield decision in which the Supreme Court
had announced its test for the legitimacy of union disciplinary
rules.6 5 Noting that the Supreme Court had warned in Scofield
that a union disciplinary rule would be valid only if it impaired no
policy Congress had embedded in the labor laws, the Board found
that a restriction on resignations impaired the section 7 right of
employees to refrain from any or all protected concerted activities,
which would include strikes and union membership.66 The Board
further noted that any effort to equate the institutional interests of
a union in preserving strike solidarity and protecting striking
members with the statutory rights of employees is inappropriate
since such interests, no matter how legitimate, are insufficient to
negate express statutory rights.6 7 It accordingly overruled its previ-
ous holding in Dalmo Victor II, to the extent that it advocated a
thirty-day holding period for resignations to take effect.
At about the same time that the Machinists Local 1414 case was
before the Board, the Seventh Circuit was involved in deciding yet
part of the employer. An unfair labor practice strike, in contrast, is activity initiated in
whole or in part in response to unfair labor practices committed by the employer. NLRB v.
Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954). Strikers
who have been engaged in an unfair labor practice strike are entitled to reinstatement to
their former jobs even if the employer has hired permanent replacements. NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
63. 270 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984).
64. Id. at 1336.
65. Id. at 1333. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
66. Machinists, Local 1414, 270 N.L.R.B. at 1333.
67. Id. at 1336.
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another restriction on resignations case. In this 1983 case, Pattern-
Makers' League of North America (Rockford-Beloit Jobbers Asso-
ciation),68 the Seventh Circuit held, in agreement with the Board,"
that a blanket provision outlawing resignation during a strike or at
a time when a strike appeared imminent was an invalid restriction
on resignations, and that the fines assessed against employees who
resigned during the time of the strike to cross the picket line
(equal to the equivalent of each crossing employee's earnings dur-
ing the strike), were violative of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
70
The Seventh Circuit noted the Board's analysis in Dalmo Victor
H, and applied a similar analysis to the Pattern Makers facts, con-
cluding that an attempt to restrict resignations during strike peri-
ods was patently invalid, since it frustrated the overriding policy of
labor law that employees should be free to choose whether to en-
gage in concerted activities.71 The Seventh Circuit, citing the Su-
preme Court in Granite State,7 2 added that an employee's section
7 rights were not lost by a union's plea for solidarity nor by its
pressures for conformity and submission to its authority.
Meanwhile, in the Ninth Circuit, the Board's Dalmo Victor H
decision was under scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit denied enforce-
ment of the Board order, and concluded that the union's rule
prohibiting resignations within fourteen days of the strike or there-
after was a reasonable union disciplinary rule under the Scofield
test.73 The Ninth Circuit found that although employees conced-
edly had a section 7 right to resign, an unfettered right to resign
during a strike was serious threat to a union's viability, in that
those who escaped punishment by resigning and crossing the
picket line would inspire others to follow suit, eventually setting
off a chain reaction which could break the union, and ultimately
give the employer greater power to set the terms and conditions of
employment.7 4 The Ninth Circuit further noted that the proviso to
section 8(b)(1)(A), allowing a union to prescribe rules for member-
ship, had been "embedded in the labor laws" for just as long as the
section 7 right of an employee to refrain from union activities.75
68. 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983).
69. Pattern Makers' League of N. Am. (Rockford-Beloit Jobbers Ass'n), 265 N.L.R.B.
1332 (1982).
70. Pattern Makers, 724 F.2d at 59.
71. Id. at 60.
72. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 218.
73. Machinists, Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor) v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984).




The Supreme Court, in 1985, took advantage of an opportunity
to address the issue of union fines on resigning members in the
Pattern Makers case. 6 In affirming the Board and the Seventh
Circuit in Pattern Makers,7 the Supreme Court agreed that the
union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by imposing fines
on members who had resigned their union membership during a
strike, despite a constitutional amendment prohibiting such resig-
nations during strike periods. The Supreme Court initially noted
that because of the Board's special competence in the field of labor
relations, its interpretation of the Act is accorded substantial def-
erence.7 8 It saw its task, then, as merely deciding whether the
Board's construction of section 8(b)(1)(A) in Pattern Makers was
reasonable.7 9 The Court then went on to conclude that the Board's
construction was reasonable.80
The Supreme Court's Pattern Makers decision settled the con-
troversy between the conflicting statutory interest of an employee's
section 7 right to resign and a union's section 8(b)(1)(A) right to
prescribe rules for members by declaring that the section
8(b)(1)(A) proviso was intended to protect union rules involving
admission and expulsion, and not the employee's right to resign
union membership. 81 The Court rejected the union's argument that
the legislative history required a finding that Congress made a con-
sidered decision not to protect a union member's right to resign as
demonstrated by its failure to include proposed language to that
effect in the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA.82 The Pat-
tern Makers Court noted that the "right to resign" was apparently
included in an original House bill to protect workers unable to re-
sign because of closed shop agreements, 83 and reasoned that since
76. Pattern Makers' League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985). Certiorari had
been granted at 105 S. Ct. 79 (1984) to resolve the conflict between the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits.
77. Justice Powell, writing the majority opinion, was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor; Justice White filed a concurring opinion; Justice
Blackmun dissented and filed an opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined;
Justice Stevens dissented and filed an opinion.
78. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3068.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 3069.
81. Id. at 3072-73.
82. Id. at 3073.
83. A closed shop, now prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act, required employees to be
union members prior to the onset of employment with an employer. A union shop requires
employees to become members of the union on or after the thirtieth day of employment
with the employer. "Membership" encompasses only a financial obligation limited to the
payment of union fees and dues. See supra note 5.
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the Taft-Hartley Act outlawed the closed shop, Congress thought
it unnecessary to explicitly preserve the right to resign. 4 The
Court further concluded that the inconsistency between union re-
strictions on the right to resign and the policy of voluntary union-
ism implicit in section 8(a)(3), were ample support for the Board's
finding a violation on the Pattern Makers facts.
8 5
Finally, in reiterating its reluctance to overrule the Board, the
Supreme Court noted that it had previously yielded to Board deci-
sions on the issue in question in which the Board had consistently
construed section 8(b)(1)(A) as prohibiting the imposition of fines
on employees who had tendered resignations which were invalid
under a union constitution."' In a concurring opinion, Justice
White added that where, as in the case of section 8(b)(1)(A), "the
statutory language is rationally susceptible to contrary readings,
and the search for congressional intent is unenlightening, defer-
ence to the Board is not only appropriate but necessary. '87 Justice
White noted that "[flor the Act to be administered with the neces-
sary flexibility and responsiveness to the 'actualities of industrial
relations,' the primary responsibility for construing its general pro-
visions must be with the Board, and that is where Congress has
placed it."'88
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion reviewed the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act,89 and concluded that Congress, in
enacting 8(b)(1)(A) and other sections, did not propose any limita-
tions with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from bar-
ring enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect a mem-
ber's employment status.90 In Justice Blackmun's view, a rule
prohibiting resignations neither coerces a worker to become a
union member nor affects an employee's status as an employee
under the Act, and thus, should be permitted under section 7 since
the Act intended to interfere with the internal affairs of unions
only where a union's rules affected an employee's status as an em-
ployee. Addressing the majority's argument that the 8(b)(1)(A)
proviso was only intended to give unions the right to regulate ad-
mission and expulsion but not resignation, Justice Blackmun
84. 105 S. Ct. at 3073.
85. Id. at 3070.
86. Id. at 3075-76.
87. Id. at 3076.
88. Id., citing NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 362-64 (1958).
89. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3077.
90. Id. at 3079.
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pointed out that the majority provided no explanation for this con-
clusion. 1 He also rejected the majority's view that the rule restrict-
ing resignations impairs a federal labor policy mandating voluntary
unionism implicit in section 8(a)(3). According to Justice
Blackmun:
"[Violuntary unionism" does not require that an employee who has freely
chosen to join a union and retain his membership therein, in full knowledge
that by those decisions he has accepted specified obligations to other mem-
bers, nevertheless has insured a federally protected right to disregard those
obligations at will, regardless of the acts of others taken in reliance on
them. " '
Justice Blackmun stated that the majority took a misplaced pater-
nalistic view of the union member by treating him as an incompe-
tent whose promise [not to resign] could not be enforced against
him because "it was presumed not to have been made with an
awareness of the consequences of the promise," and that this pa-
ternalism threatened the power to act collectively; a power central
to the Act." Justice Blackmun added that this promise was merely
a quid pro quo for the benefits that member had "received as a
result of his decision to band together with. . . fellow workers and
to join collective bargaining. "94 Finally, Justice Blackmun noted
the harsh reality that before workers strike, it is reasonable that
they have some assurance that collectively they will have the
means to withstand the pressures the employer is able lawfully to
impose on them, and noted further that a member's decision to
return to work could have, as in the case before the Court, a
snowballing effect causing the strike to lose its effectiveness. 5
Justice Stevens, in his separate dissent, concluded that the legis-
lative history, coupled with the plain language in the proviso to
section 8(b)(1)(A) evidenced that the right to refrain from collec-
tive activity did not encompass the right to resign.9
The five-four split in the Supreme Court's Pattern Makers deci-
sion, the reluctance of prior Supreme Courts to express their view
on the right to resign faced with the opportunity in similar cases,"
91. Id.
92. Id. at 3081-82.
93. Id. at 3082.
94. Id. at 3083.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3085.
97. In Allis-Chalmers, the Supreme Court specifically limited its holding to the pre-
sumption that the employees fined were union members. In both Granite State and Booster
Lodge, the Supreme Court noted that it was not deciding the extent to which a contractual
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the variety of commentators taking completely opposing views on
the issue,98 and the Board's own change of view on the matter, all
point to the conclusion that the Pattern Makers choice was a diffi-
cult one, amply supported by compelling interests on both sides. In
answering the issue in favor of the employee, the Pattern Makers
majority chose to ground its opinion in its obligation to defer to
the Board's expertise rather than to make the difficult choice be-
tween the interests of the employee and those of the union.
Whether viewed as a reasonable attempt to settle eighteen years of
cases since Allis-Chalmers involving union fining of picket-line
crossers, or as an aberration, there can be no doubt that the deci-
sion's impact on the usefulness of a strike by unions to achieve
their goals is significant. As the dissent by Justice Blackmun
noted, strikes are costly,"9 and no union is going to incur the ex-
penses of strike benefits and the risk of severe financial loss to its
members should the strike be lengthy, in instances where it sus-
pects that it will have too many defectors to make the strike
worthwhile. Without the trump card of union fines to instill in
workers an incentive not to cross the picket line, there is not much
left in the union's hand, short of peer pressure, to hold the strike
together. Only time will tell whether unions, faced with these con-
straints under the Pattern Makers holding, will abandon the strike
strategy in favor of other means to achieve their goals.
As a result of the Court's decision, unions may be forced to ac-
cept whatever offers an employer makes at the bargaining table,
knowing that the strike is no longer a viable alternative to protect-
ing the employer's position.
relationship between union and member might curtail the freedom to resign. See supra
notes 13, 29 & 34 and accompanying text.
98. Millan, Disciplinary Developments Under §8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 20 Loy. L. REv. 245 (1974) (advocating a rule that resignations should not be
effective for sixty to ninety days); Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 YALe
L.J. 1022 (1976) (advocating a finding of violation where union members are not fully in-
formed of their right to limit membership to the payment of dues and initiation fees only);
Comment, Union Security and Union Members' Freedom to Resign: The National Labor
Relations Board's Thirty-Day Rule in Dalmo Victor, 14 TEx. TECH L. REv. 593 (1983) (sup-
porting the rule that resignations should not be effective until 30 days after tender); Ogden,
Dalmo- Victor: A Troubled Sleep Deserves a Hershey Kiss, 35 LAB. L.J. 374 (1984) (propos-
ing that the Board adopt the standard enunciated in NLRB v. Hershey Foods Corp., 513
F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975) (right to resign only for dues paying members)); Note, A Union's
Right to Control Strike-Period Resignations, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 339 (1985) (recommending
the right to resign only before a strike vote is taken).
99. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3083.
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III. THE RIGHT TO HONOR ANOTHER'S PICKET LINE - THE
BOARD'S NEW RULING ON BROARD NO-STRIKE CLAUSES
An integral part of any strike is persuading other employees to withhold
their services and join in making the strike more effective, and it cannot be
denied that respect for the integrity of the picket line may well be the
source of strength of the whole collective bargaining process in which every
union member has a legitimate and protected economic interest.100
The Board has consistently held that the right to honor another
union's picket line (known as a sympathy strike) is an employee
right created and protected by section 7 of the Act.101 Accordingly,
an employee who in the course of his duties as a truck driver, for
example, encountered a picket line at a delivery stop and refused
to cross it, could not be disciplined by his employer for this re-
fusal.102 The freedom to refuse to cross a picket line, however, can
be restricted by an agreement between an employer and a union.
In NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 03 the Supreme Court
recognized that an employer and union may include a provision in
their contract prohibiting an employee from refusing to cross a
picket line if they so agree.104
Beginning with the Supreme Court's decision on the use of con-
tractual clauses concerning picket line rights in Rockaway, a line of
cases developed with respect to whether a broad no-strike clause,
not specifically mentioning sympathy strikes, could proscribe an
employee's right to refuse to cross another union's picket line. The
issue arose because of traditional notions that a union's promise
not to strike was given in exchange for the employer's promise to
arbitrate. 05 The sympathy strike, however, does not involve con-
tractual disputes under the sympathy striker's own contract, and
100. NLRB v. Southern Calif. Edison, 646 F.2d 1352, 1363 (9th Cir. 1981).
101. See, e.g., Business Services by Manpower, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (1984); Tor-
rington Constr. Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1540 (1978); Redwing Carriers, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962).
102. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-186 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 8 of the NLRA states in
part:
(a) Unfair labor practice by employer
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7.
29 U.S.C. § 158.
103. 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
104. Id. at 79. In Rockaway, the Supreme Court found a sympathy strike unprotected
by the NLRA because of its finding that the union had effectively waived their rights to
honor picket lines of another union in contract negotiations.
105. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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generally is not arbitrable. Thus, the question is whether a broad
no-strike clause could encompass a prohibition against sympathy
strikes. As the Board has explained, a problem arises concerning
sympathy strikes because the grievance and arbitration machinery
in any contract is normally designed to cover only disputes arising
out of an interpretation or application of the sympathy striker's
own contract.106 Accordingly, grievance and arbitration clauses can
hardly be utilized to resolve disputes between persons who are
strangers to the sympathy strikers' contract. Thus, sympathy strik-
ers are normally excluded from the ambit of no-strike clauses be-
cause such clauses are limited in their application to the scope of
contract grievance machinery.
107
Even in the absence of an express no-strike provision, the Su-
preme Court has held that an undertaking not to strike would be
implied only where the strike was over issues which were subject to
arbitration." 8 This position is commonly known as the common
law doctrine of coterminous interpretation. 09
In Gary-Hobart Water Corp.,"0 the Board held that a broad no-
strike clause did not constitute a waiver of the union's right to
honor another union's picket line. In reaching its conclusion, the
Board noted that while statutory rights may be waived, the Board
and the courts have repeatedly emphasized that such waivers will
not be readily inferred. Instead, there must be a clear and unmis-
takable showing that waiver occurred."' The Board pointed out
that it is fundamental that the right to strike is guaranteed by the
Act, and noted that this is so, whether the strike is for economic
reasons, for the purposes of improving working conditions, or for
the mutual aid and protection of employee-members of another
union. 1 2 The Board extended this reasoning to conclude that the
right to engage in a sympathy strike is also protected, but again
warned that waiver of such statutory rights would not be readily
106. W-I Canteen Serv. Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 609, 613 (1978).
107. Id. at 613.
108. Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
109. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
110. 210 N.L.R.B. 742, enforced, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925
(1975).
111. Gary-Hobart, 210 N.L.R.B. at 744, citing Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB,
325 F.2d 745 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964); Rockwell-Standard Corp.,
Transmission & Axle Div., Forge Div., 166 N.L.R.B. 124, enforced, 410 F.2d 953 (6th Cir.
1969); The Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1582 (1964); Beacon Pierce Dyeing and Finish-
ing Co., Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958).




In support of its conclusion, the Board cited the Supreme
Court's decision in Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour Co.11 4 There, the Su-
preme Court indicated that no-strike provisions would not be en-
forced where the subject of the dispute was not covered by the
grievance-arbitration procedure." 5 The Supreme Court in Lucas
Flour further added that a strike to settle a dispute, which a col-
lective-bargaining agreement provides shall be settled exclusively
and finally by compulsory arbitration, constitutes a violation of the
agreement. Such a no-strike agreement, the Court announced, is
not to be implied beyond the area which has been agreed will be
exclusively covered by compulsory arbitration.
In Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers,"' the Supreme Court con-
cluded that a federal court may not enjoin a sympathy strike pend-
ing the outcome of arbitration concerning whether or not the strike
is prohibited by a no-strike provision in the labor contract. In
reaching its holding, the Court cited its decision in Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770," where it had noted that a no-
strike clause is the quid pro quo for an extensive arbitration
clause.
Notwithstanding the quid pro quo equation in Boys Market, the
Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge noted that a sympathy strike was
involved and that the parties had agreed that the strike was not
over any dispute between union and employer even remotely sub-
ject to the arbitration provisions of the contract." 8 The Supreme
Court further noted that the sympathy strike at issue was in sup-
port of sister unions negotiating with the employer, and that
neither its causes nor the issue underlying it was subject to the
settlement procedures provided by the contract between the em-
ployer and the union." 9 The Court reasoned that since a sympathy
strike had neither the purpose nor the effect of avoiding an obliga-
tion to arbitrate, the quid pro quo for which the parties had bar-
gained was not infringed upon. 20 The Court warned in dicta,
113. Id.
114. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
115. Id. at 106.
116. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
117. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
118. Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 407.
119. Id. at 407-08.
120. Id. at 408.
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moreover, that to the extent that other courts had assumed that a
mandatory arbitration clause implied a commitment not to engage
in sympathy strikes, they were in error. 21
In C. K. Smith & Co., 12 2 the Board faced the issue of whether a
sympathy strike was prohibited by a no-strike clause which pro-
vided, "there shall be no strike, work stoppage or interruption of
work during the term of the Agreement .... ,1*"' The Board con-
cluded that this contractual language was insufficient to reveal a
waiver of the right to strike in sympathy with other employees.124
In cases following C. K. Smith, the Board consistently held that
broad no-strike clauses would not prohibit sympathy strikes.125
Typically, the Board has examined the bargaining history of the
parties in determining whether employees have waived their right
to engage in sympathy strikes. In St. Regis Paper Co., 2 6 the Board
found that the overall bargaining history pointed decisively to a
"conscious waiver of the right to engage in sympathy strikes." In
reaching this decision, the Board noted that the union, one of a
number of unions at the employer's paper mill, had repeatedly
crossed picket lines of the other locals in prior years, under the
assumption that they were bound by a broad no-strike clause.
In W-I Canteen Service, Inc.,117 the Board found a discharge of
sympathy strikers unlawful where the sympathy strikers' labor
contract contained the following no-strike clause:
The Company and the Union agree that there will be no strike or lockout
during the life of this Agreement so long as the Company and the Union
abide by the terms of this Agreement or submit to arbitration any differ-
ences which may arise which are not covered by this Agreement.2 8
Additionally, the contract contained a provision that the employer
would not require the employees to cross picket lines at the prem-
ises of any other company. 29 The sympathy strikers in question
had respected the picket line of another local union at their own
121. Id. at 408 n.10.
122. N.L.R.B. v. C.K. Smith & Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1977), enforced, 569 F.2d 162
(1st Cir. 1978).
123. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1073.
124. W-I Canteen Serv. Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 606 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1979).
125. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp., 264 N.L.R.B. 76 (1982); Amcar Div., ACF
Indus. Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 1056 (1980); Union Boiler Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 719 (1979); Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1979); Daniel Constr. Co., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1979).
126. 253 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1229 (1981).
127. 238 N.L.R.B. 609 (1978).
128. Id. at 610.
129. Id. at 614.
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place of employment, and the Board found a violation, noting that
no explicit waiver of the right to engage in sympathy strikes had
been made.130 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dis-
agreed, concluding that the picket line permission clause which
permitted employees to honor picket lines at other companies'
premises brought one to the natural conclusion that sympathy
strikes were prohibited at the employer's own premises.131 The
court noted that when the no-strike clause was first drafted, the
NLRB had not yet enunciated its rule that broad no-strike clauses
did not waive the right to engage in sympathy strikes. Further, evi-
dence of defeated proposals during negotiations concerning the
right to engage in sympathy strikes, coupled with express provi-
sions on the subject of sympathy strikes, provided sufficient evi-
dence to satisfy the court that the union had waived its right to
honor another local's picket line whether at the other company's
premises or at the employer's premises."1
2
The circuit courts have taken a variety of positions concerning
the effect of a broad no-strike clause on an employee's right to
honor another picket line. Prior to the W-I Canteen Service case,
the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in NLRB v. Kel-
ler-Crescent Co."'3 In Keller-Crescent, the court concluded that
the employer could suspend employees who had honored a picket
line of another union at the employer's premises, where the sympa-
thy strikers were covered by a broad no-strike clause, and a clause
that specifically permitted employees to honor only the picket lines
erected by locals of their own international union. 3 4 The Seventh
Circuit noted in Keller-Crescent that the picket line clause permit-
ted the court to distinguish the facts in Keller-Crescent from prior
Board and court holdings permitting sympathy strikes despite no-
strike clauses. The Keller-Crescent court also found the employer's
efforts to submit the dispute to arbitration to be a significant
consideration.85
More recently, in United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB,' 36 the
Seventh Circuit held that where a broad no-strike clause is func-
tionally independent of an arbitration clause in a labor contract,
130. Id. at 616.
131. W-I Canteen Serv. Inc., 606 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1979).
132. Id. at 746-47.
133. 538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1299.
136. 711 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1983).
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the no-strike clause constitutes a clear and unmistakable waiver of
an employee's right to engage in a sympathy strike. In reaching
this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit noted that the bargaining his-
tory revealed that the no-strike obligation had been given because
of the parties' common interest in achieving uninterrupted plant
operations to combat dire foreign competition, rather than as an
exchange for the duty on the part of the employer to arbitrate.137
Beyond these cases, the Seventh Circuit has not gone so far as to
suggest that a broad no-strike clause, standing alone, could pro-
hibit sympathy strikes. The District of Columbia Circuit, however,
has so held. In News Union of Baltimore v. NLRB, 3 the union
had petitioned the court to set aside a Board order dismissing a
complaint against the employer for locking out employees who had
honored another union's picket line at the employer's plant. The
sympathy strikers, who were members of the Teamsters, had a
contract with the employer which provided that the union and its
members would not, during the life of the contract, take part in
any strike, sit down, picketing or other curtailment or restricting of
the delivery of the companies' newspapers until the grievance pro-
cedure had been exhausted.13 9 The Board found the lockout per-
missible, and thus dismissed the complaint, noting that inasmuch
as a waiver of the right to engage in a sympathy strike had been
made by the union, the sympathy strike was unprotected. " " The
Board found a waiver by examining the bargaining history of the
parties. Specifically, the Board found that the parties had inter-
preted the broad no-strike clause to prohibit sympathy strikes. Ev-
idence existed that the union had made a contract proposal seek-
ing the right to engage in sympathy strikes that had been rejected
by the employer, and later abandoned by the union.14 1
The District of Columbia Court focused on the language of the
no-strike clause itself, however, in affirming the Board's position.
The court rejected the union's argument that language which pro-
hibits any strike should not be read as prohibiting sympathy
strikes. It further noted that the practical relationship between
work stoppages and the honoring of picket lines is so well under-
stood in the industrial climate that a clause of this kind, using only
the word "strike," includes plant suspensions resulting from refus-
137. Id.
138. 393 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
139. Id. at 676-77 n.4.
140. The Hearst Corporation, News Am. Div., 161 N.L.R.B. 1405 (1966).
141. Id. at 1416.
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als to report for work across picket lines. " 2 The court thus held
that a broad no-strike clause could prohibit sympathy strikes. The
District of Columbia Court has not again spoken on the issue since
this 1968 case.
The Eighth Circuit has also taken the view that a broad no-
strike clause can prohibit sympathy strikes.143 In Iowa Beef
Processors,' the Eighth Circuit held that a broad no-strike clause
coupled with a clause requiring the union to promptly order its
members to resume their normal duties notwithstanding the exis-
tence of any picket line, and statements by union officials to sym-
pathy striker members that their strike was unauthorized, evi-
denced that a sympathy strike was prohibited under the parties'
contract. The Eighth Circuit deemed it immaterial that the arbi-
tration machinery could not resolve the issues underlying the sym-
pathy strike."
5
The First Circuit addressed the sympathy strike issue in NLRB
v. C. K. Smith & Co.,'" where it held, in agreement with the
Board, that a no-strike clause which prohibits "any strike" does
not rise to the level of a clear and unmistakable waiver of the right
to engage in sympathy strikes.
The Tenth Circuit has also held that a broad no-strike clause
will not prohibit a sympathy strike, absent a clear and unmistaka-
ble waiver."
7
The Third Circuit took its opportunity to speak on the issue in
Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 326.148 In
that case, an action was brought by the employer under section 301
of the NLRA" 9 seeking damages for an alleged breach of contract
arising from the union's actions in honoring a picket line of an-
142. News Union, 393 F.2d at 677.
143. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972).
144. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen,
Local Union No. 1196, 597 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
145. 597 F.2d at 1145.
146. 569 F.2d 162 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 957 (1978). See supra notes 118-19
and accompanying text.
147. NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 930
(1981).
148. 624 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1980).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Section 301(a) states in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in the Act, or be-
tween any such labor organization may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Section 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
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other local at the employer's plant, despite a no-strike clause.150
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware
awarded damages to the employer.151 The Third Circuit reversed,
applying the coterminous interpretation theory to reach its conclu-
sion."' The court noted that under this theory, it is proper to pre-
sume that the no-strike clause is not broader than the arbitration
clause, and thus where the sympathy strikers cannot arbitrate the
subject matter of the primary dispute, a generally worded no-strike
clause does not bar the sympathy strike.153
In further support of its conclusion, the Third Circuit analogized
its decision to the Supreme Court's decision in Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB.' 54 In Mastro Plastics, the Supreme Court had con-
cluded that a broad, general no-strike clause did not waive the
right to engage in unfair labor practice strikes (strikes to protest
acts of the employer which would violate the NLRA).' 5 5 The Su-
preme Court noted in that case that the contract, taken as a whole,
dealt with the economic relations between the employees and the
employer concerning wages, hours, and working conditions, and
thus, in effect, the no-strike clause was a promise by the union not
to strike over matters covered by the contract, not to refrain from
striking over unfair labor practices of the employer.156 The Third
Circuit applied the Supreme Court's rationale in Mastro Plastics,
concerning a no-strike clause in an unfair labor practice strike set-
ting, to the sympathy strike setting in Delaware Coca-Cola. Ac-
cordingly, the Third Circuit held that a broad no-strike clause can-
not constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to
sympathy strike, since the underlying issue in the primary strike
150. 624 F.2d at 1183-84. The no-strike clause provided:
Section 1. The Union will not cause nor will any member of the bargaining unit take
part in any strike, sit-down, stay-in, or slow down in any operation of the Company
or any curtailment of work or restriction of service or interference with the operation
of the Company or any picketing or patrolling during the term of this Agreement.
Section 3. The provisions of this Article, other than as mentioned above, shall not be
subject to grievance or arbitration, for the purpose of assessing damages or securing
specific performance, or any other matter, such matters of law being determinable
and enforceable in the courts.
Id.
151. 474 F. Supp. 777 (D. Del. 1979).
152. Delaware Coca-Cola, 624 F.2d at 1187. The coterminous interpretation theory is
discussed supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
153. 624 F.2d at 1187.
154. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 281-83.
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would not be subject to arbitration under the sympathy strikers'
own contract.
157
In NLRB v. Southern California Edison Co., 158 the Ninth Cir-
cuit took a similar view to that of the Third Circuit with respect to
a broad no-strike clause. The Ninth Circuit enforced a Board or-
der159 which concluded that the employer had unlawfully sus-
pended an employee and threatened to discipline others after the
employees' refusal to cross the picket line of a sister local at the
employer's plant.'10 The court concluded that the discipline and
threats of discipline were unlawful, noting that a broad no-strike
clause would not prohibit sympathy strikes where although there
existed some evidence of a waiver of this right, it was insufficient
to amount to a clear and unmistakable waiver.16' The court de-
ferred to the Board's finding that there had been no clear waiver
despite the union's unsuccessful attempts to add language to the
contract seeking the right to honor stranger picket lines. 62 In con-
cluding that no waiver was present, the Board noted that the em-
ployer and union had a thirty-year history of not requiring em-
ployees to cross strangers' picket lines whenever it was possible to
delay the work until a later time, and never requiring an employee
to cross a picket line where there was a danger of physical vio-
lence.1 '6 In view of this, the Board concluded, and the Ninth Cir-
cuit agreed, that no waiver could be found.
In summary, although the District of Columbia, and Eighth Cir-
cuit courts have taken the absolute view of a broad no-strike clause
as prohibiting sympathy strikes,'164 and the Seventh Circuit has
taken an intermediate position, the Board and the remainder of
circuit courts that have addressed the issue have consistently taken
the opposing view. Very recently, in NLRB v. Indianapolis Power
& Light Co.,'" the Board reversed its long line of case law in the
157. 624 F.2d at 1187.
158. 646 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1981).
159. 243 N.L.R.B. 372 (1979).
160. 646 F.2d at 1369.
161. Id. at 1366.
162. Id. See 243 N.L.R.B. at 381.
163. 243 N.L.R.B. at 381.
164. See supra notes 126 & 131 and accompanying text.
165. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 211 (1985), 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201. In Arizona Public Serv.
Co., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 210 (1985), 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1227, decided the same day as Indi-
anapolis Power & Light, the Board concluded that an employer was free to suspend sympa-
thy strikers, where the contract contained a broad no-strike clause, and a clause authorizing
the employer to discipline those who engaged in unauthorized work stoppages. The Board
did not address the question of whether the sympathy strike was prohibited by the no-strike
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area. In the Indianapolis Power & Light case, the administrative
law judge concluded that the employer violated the Act by sus-
pending and threatening to discharge an employee who had
honored a stranger picket line at the premises of the employer's
customer. 166 The administrative law judge, following Board prece-
dent, reasoned that because the contractual no-strike language did
not expressly mention sympathy strikes, the contract would not
bar them unless extrinsic evidence clearly showed the parties' in-
tent to do SO. 16 7 The administrative law judge examined the par-
ties' bargaining history and found it insufficient to establish a sym-
pathy strike waiver. 1"6
The Board reversed, announcing that it would now conclude that
a broad no-strike clause bars employees from honoring stranger
picket lines.169 In reaching its conclusion the Board noted that al-
though previous Board decisions had held that sympathy strikes
were outside the scope of broad no-strike clauses, it could discern
no logical or practical basis for the proposition that the prohibition
of all "strikes" does not include sympathy strikes merely because
the word "sympathy" is not used.1 70 The Board concluded that if a
contract prohibited strikes, it would read that prohibition as
prohibiting all strikes, including sympathy strikes, unless the con-
tract or extrinsic evidence established that the parties intended to
exclude sympathy strikes from the rigors of the no-strike clause. 17 1,
In applying its new rule to the Indianapolis Power & Light facts,
the Board thus concluded that no violation occurred by the em-
ployer's suspension of one employee and threats of discharge to
others for their refusals to cross a stranger picket line.
In reviewing the Indianapolis Power & Light decision, it is nec-
essary to recall the rationale for exempting sympathy strikes from
a no-strike clause. The Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge discussed
clause but rather, reached its conclusion based on the fact that the union had specifically
advised the employer by letter that it had not authorized the work stoppage, viewed in light
of the contractual clause permitting discipline if a work stoppage were unauthorized.
166. Indianapolis Power & Light, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 211 at 1.
167. Id. at 2. The no-strike clause reads as follows:
The Union and each employee covered by the agreement agree not to cause, en-
courage, permit, or take part in any strike, picketing, sit-down, stay-in, slow-down, or
other curtailment of work or interference with the operation of the Company's busi-




170. Id. at 2-3.
171. Id. at 3.
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this rationale."'2 Simply put, a broad no-strike clause does not in-
clude a prohibition against sympathy strikes because the no-strike
clause is the quid pro quo for an arbitration clause, and the sym-
pathy strike is not an issue which can be arbitrated under the sym-
pathy strikers' contract. The primary issue in Buffalo Forge in-
volved whether a federal court could enjoin a sympathy strike
pending the outcome of an arbitration concerning whether the
strike was prohibited by the no-strike clause. It is nonetheless sig-
nificant, however, that in Buffalo Forge, the Supreme Court
warned that to the extent that other courts have assumed that a
mandatory arbitration clause implies a commitment not to engage
in sympathy strikes, they are wrong.1 73 With the exception of the
Seventh Circuit, the numerous Board and court opinions which
have addressed the issue since Buffalo Forge have grounded their
opinions upon that rationale, and have found sympathy strikes un-
lawful only by distinguishing their facts in reaching the conclusion
that a clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to engage in a
sympathy strike was present. 7 "
It is suggested that the prior Board decisions were a reasonable
accommodation between employer and union: although the prior
case law would not go so far as to conclude that a broad no-strike
clause could prohibit sympathy strikes, the employer could accom-
plish this result with more specific contractual language175 and/or
evidence that the union had somehow waived its right to argue
that the no-strike clause did not include a prohibition against sym-
pathy strikes. Indeed, an employer could accomplish a waiver
merely by forcing the issue at the bargaining table.
In its Indianapolis Power & Light decision, the Board gave no
172. See supra notes 111 & 113 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
174. Only the Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits have taken the view that a
broad no-strike clause, standing alone, can prohibit sympathy strikes. Both of these courts'
decisions, however, were pre-Buffalo Forge. See supra notes 126 & 131 and accompanying
text. The Seventh Circuit opinion in Keller-Crescent concluded that the Supreme Court's
discussion of no-strike clauses as they affect sympathy strikes in an injunction setting was
no longer viably read in deciding Board enforcement cases. Keller-Crescent, 538 F.2d at
1296.
175. Two commentators have stressed the importance of clear and concise language in
no-strike clauses as a result of the Board's position in W-I Canteen Serv. See Stephens and
Ledgerwood, Do No-Strike Clauses Prohibit Sympathy Strikes? 33 LAB. L.J. 294, 304 (1982).
Another commentator has suggested that a uniform standard requiring explicit language in
the contract to prohibit sympathy strikes would solve the problem of resorting to extrinsic
evidence to decide the waiver question. See Rubin, To Cross or Not to Cross: Picket Lines
and Employee Rights, 4 INDus. REL. L.J. 419, 447 (1981).
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consideration to the underlying rationale for the exemption of
sympathy strikes from a broad no-strike clause as announced in
Buffalo Forge. Rather, the Board concluded that it should reverse
the administrative law judge only because it saw "no logical or
practical basis" for the exemption of sympathy strikes from a no-
strike clause. 7 6 Perhaps the Board's failure to address the underly-
ing rationale for its prior holdings stems from its inability to effec-
tively distinguish that rationale and the long line of cases which
supported it.
The effect of the new Board ruling is that no employee, who is
covered by a collective-bargaining agreement containing a no-
strike clause, is going to take the chance of guessing whether his
conduct in refusing to honor a stranger picket line will be pro-
tected. The Board's decisions prior to Indianapolis Power & Light
places the burden of proving that a sympathy strike was included
in the no-strike clause upon the employer; the Indianapolis Power
& Light decision shifts that burden to the union. Consequently,
this burden is shifted to the individual employee where, for exam-
ple, the employee unexpectedly encounters a picket line at a deliv-
ery stop. Faced with the decision to cross or not to cross, it is likely
that the employee will not take the chance of guessing that his
conduct will be protected. As the Board previously noted in W-I
Canteen Service:
The employees who were called upon during the early morning hours of
May 10 to decide whether or not to cross the Teamsters picket at Rockford
could benefit from none of these niceties of litigation and had at their dis-
posal none of these aids [e.g., extrinsic evidence of bargaining history and
conduct of the parties] to contract interpretation. Yet they had to stake
their jobs on the correctness of their position.1
77
Given the Board's short three-page opinion, it is difficult to spec-
ulate as to the Board's reasoning in overruling its prior holding.
178
Its impact, however, is clear-the employee's right to honor a
stranger picket line will now be severely limited.
176. Indianapolis Power & Light, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 211 at 2-3.
177. W-I Canteen Serv. 238 N.L.R.B. at 617.
178. The Supreme Court has not spoken on the specific issue raised in Indianapolis
Power & Light. The three-member Board panel that decided Indianapolis Power & Light
are Reagan appointees who have effected a variety of significant changes in Board law since
their appointments. These changes have been predominantly in favor of employers.
Whether such changes will ultimately be adopted by the circuit courts and the Supreme
Court cannot be predicted with certainty.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The overall impact of Pattern Makers and Indianapolis Power
& Light remains to be seen. There can be no doubt, however, that
these decisions, taken together, will weaken the effectiveness of
strikes as a means of applying economic pressure on employers to
accede to union demands. As a result of these decisions, a union
will no longer be able to count on its own members to refrain from
resigning during the course of a strike. Of course, the inevitable
fate of a strike without support is failure. Whether this is viewed
as a necessary or unwarranted result depends upon one's view of
unionism as a means for the betterment of working conditions.
Knowing, however, that unions may no longer be able to call an
effective strike, employers may use this opportunity to gain greater
concessions at the bargaining table.
Marianne Oliver
